A civilisation that used to lead the world is in
ruins—and only the locals can rebuild it
A THOUSAND years ago, the great
cities of Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo took turns to race ahead of the Western
world. Islam and innovation were twins. The various Arab caliphates were
dynamic superpowers—beacons of learning, tolerance and trade. Yet today the
Arabs are in a wretched state. Even as Asia, Latin America and Africa advance,
the Middle East is held back by despotism and convulsed by war.
Hopes soared three years ago, when a
wave of unrest across the region led to the overthrow of four dictators—in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen—and to a clamour for change elsewhere, notably
in Syria. But the Arab spring’s fruit has rotted into renewed autocracy and
war. Both engender misery and fanaticism that today threaten the wider world.
In this sectionWhy Arab countries
have so miserably failed to create democracy, happiness or (aside from the
windfall of oil) wealth for their 350m people is one of the great questions of
our time. What makes Arab society susceptible to vile regimes and fanatics bent
on destroying them (and their perceived allies in the West)? No one suggests
that the Arabs as a people lack talent or suffer from some pathological
antipathy to democracy. But for the Arabs to wake from their nightmare, and for
the world to feel safe, a great deal needs to change.
The blame game
One problem is that the Arab
countries’ troubles run so wide. Indeed, Syria and Iraq can nowadays barely be
called countries at all. This week a brutal band of jihadists declared their
boundaries void, heralding instead a new Islamic caliphate to embrace Iraq and
Greater Syria (including Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and bits of Turkey)
and—in due course—the whole world. Its leaders seek to kill non-Muslims not
just in the Middle East but also in the streets of New York, London and Paris.
Egypt is back under military rule. Libya, following the violent demise of
Muammar Qaddafi, is at the mercy of unruly militias. Yemen is beset by
insurrection, infighting and al-Qaeda. Palestine is still far from true
statehood and peace: the murders of three young Israelis and ensuing reprisals
threaten to set off yet another cycle of violence (see article). Even
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Algeria, whose regimes are cushioned by
wealth from oil and gas and propped up by an iron-fisted apparatus of state
security, are more fragile than they look. Only Tunisia, which opened the
Arabs’ bid for freedom three years ago, has the makings of a real democracy.
Islam, or at least modern
reinterpretations of it, is at the core of some of the Arabs’ deep troubles.
The faith’s claim, promoted by many of its leading lights, to combine spiritual
and earthly authority, with no separation of mosque and state, has stunted the
development of independent political institutions. A militant minority of
Muslims are caught up in a search for legitimacy through ever more fanatical
interpretations of the Koran. Other Muslims, threatened by militia violence and
civil war, have sought refuge in their sect. In Iraq and Syria plenty of Shias
and Sunnis used to marry each other; too often today they resort to maiming
each other. And this violent perversion of Islam has spread to places as
distant as northern Nigeria and northern England.
But religious extremism is a conduit
for misery, not its fundamental cause (see article). While
Islamic democracies elsewhere (such as Indonesia—see article) are
doing fine, in the Arab world the very fabric of the state is weak. Few Arab
countries have been nations for long. The dead hand of the Turks’ declining
Ottoman empire was followed after the first world war by the humiliation of
British and French rule. In much of the Arab world the colonial powers
continued to control or influence events until the 1960s. Arab countries have
not yet succeeded in fostering the institutional prerequisites of democracy—the
give-and-take of parliamentary discourse, protection for minorities, the
emancipation of women, a free press, independent courts and universities and
trade unions.
The absence of a liberal state has
been matched by the absence of a liberal economy. After independence, the
prevailing orthodoxy was central planning, often Soviet-inspired. Anti-market,
anti-trade, pro-subsidy and pro-regulation, Arab governments strangled their
economies. The state pulled the levers of economic power—especially where oil
was involved. Where the constraints of post-colonial socialism were lifted,
capitalism of the crony, rent-seeking kind took hold, as it did in the later
years of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Privatisation was for pals of the government.
Virtually no markets were free, barely any world-class companies developed, and
clever Arabs who wanted to excel in business or scholarship had to go to
America or Europe to do so.
Economic stagnation bred
dissatisfaction. Monarchs and presidents-for-life defended themselves with
secret police and goons. The mosque became a source of public services and one
of the few places where people could gather and hear speeches. Islam was
radicalised and the angry men who loathed their rulers came to hate the Western
states that backed them. Meanwhile a vast number of the young grew restless
because of unemployment. Thanks to the electronic media, they were increasingly
aware that the prospects of their cohort outside the Middle East were far more
hopeful. The wonder is not that they took to the streets in the Arab spring,
but that they did not do so sooner.
A lot of ruin
These wrongs cannot easily or
rapidly be put right. Outsiders, who have often been drawn to the region as
invaders and occupiers, cannot simply stamp out the jihadist cause or impose
prosperity and democracy. That much, at least, should be clear after the disastrous
invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Military support—the supply of drones
and of a small number of special forces—may help keep the jihadists in Iraq at
bay. That help may have to be on permanent call. Even if the new caliphate is
unlikely to become a recognisable state, it could for many years produce
jihadists able to export terrorism.
But only the Arabs can reverse their
civilisational decline, and right now there is little hope of that happening.
The extremists offer none. The mantra of the monarchs and the military men is
“stability”. In a time of chaos, its appeal is understandable, but repression
and stagnation are not the solution. They did not work before; indeed they were
at the root of the problem. Even if the Arab awakening is over for the moment,
the powerful forces that gave rise to it are still present. The social media
which stirred up a revolution in attitudes cannot be uninvented. The men in
their palaces and their Western backers need to understand that stability
requires reform.
Is that a vain hope? Today the
outlook is bloody. But ultimately fanatics devour themselves. Meanwhile,
wherever possible, the moderate, secular Sunnis who comprise the majority of
Arab Muslims need to make their voices heard. And when their moment comes, they
need to cast their minds back to the values that once made the Arab world
great. Education underpinned its primacy in medicine, mathematics, architecture
and astronomy. Trade paid for its fabulous metropolises and their spices and
silks. And, at its best, the Arab world was a cosmopolitan haven for Jews,
Christians and Muslims of many sects, where tolerance fostered creativity and
invention.
Pluralism, education, open markets:
these were once Arab values and they could be so again. Today, as Sunnis and Shias
tear out each others’ throats in Iraq and Syria and a former general settles
onto his new throne in Egypt, they are tragically distant prospects. But for a
people for whom so much has gone so wrong, such values still make up a vision
of a better future.
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